Graduate admission with financial support (Q1985735): Difference between revisions

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Latest revision as of 08:32, 22 July 2024

scientific article
Language Label Description Also known as
English
Graduate admission with financial support
scientific article

    Statements

    Graduate admission with financial support (English)
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    7 April 2020
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    matching
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    graduate admission
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    financial support
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    stability
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    strategy-proofness
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    respecting improvement
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    Identifiers