Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set rationalization of choice functions (Q2202240): Difference between revisions

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Latest revision as of 16:06, 23 July 2024

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Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set rationalization of choice functions
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    Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set rationalization of choice functions (English)
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    17 September 2020
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    von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set
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    choice function
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    rationalization of choice
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