Executive compensation and competitive pressure in the product market: how does firm entry shape managerial incentives? (Q2203485): Difference between revisions

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-Kaniska Dam
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+Kaniska Dam
@@ Property / author: Kaniska Dam / rank @@
+Normal rank
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+MaRDI publication profile
@@ Property / MaRDI profile type: MaRDI publication profile / rank @@
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+W3014295376
@@ Property / OpenAlex ID: W3014295376 / rank @@
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Capacity precommitment as a barrier to entry: A Bertrand-Edgeworth approach
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+Perfect competition as the limit of a hierarchical market game
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem
@@ Property / cites work: An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem / rank @@
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Endogenous firm efficiency in a Cournot principal-agent model
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+Managerial Incentives and Product Market Competition
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