Executive compensation and competitive pressure in the product market: how does firm entry shape managerial incentives? (Q2203485): Difference between revisions
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| Property / cites work: Perfect competition as the limit of a hierarchical market game / rank | |||
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Latest revision as of 17:31, 23 July 2024
scientific article
| Language | Label | Description | Also known as |
|---|---|---|---|
| English | Executive compensation and competitive pressure in the product market: how does firm entry shape managerial incentives? |
scientific article |
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Executive compensation and competitive pressure in the product market: how does firm entry shape managerial incentives? (English)
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7 October 2020
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oligopolistic competition
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firm entry
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managerial incentives
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