Should I remember more than you? Best responses to factored strategies (Q2021813): Difference between revisions

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+René Levínský
@@ Property / author: René Levínský / rank @@
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+MaRDI publication profile
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+https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-020-00733-1
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+W3093648755
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+The Structure of Nash Equilibrium in Repeated Games with Finite Automata
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+Q3956774
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+Cooperation and bounded recall
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+Repeated games with finite automata
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+Discrete Dynamic Programming
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+Bounded complexity justifies cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
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