The (non-)robustness of influential cheap talk equilibria when the sender's preferences are state independent (Q2051507): Difference between revisions

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Latest revision as of 08:06, 27 July 2024

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The (non-)robustness of influential cheap talk equilibria when the sender's preferences are state independent
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    The (non-)robustness of influential cheap talk equilibria when the sender's preferences are state independent (English)
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    24 November 2021
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    cheap talk
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    communication
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    information transmission
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    robustness
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