Truth and reduction (Q1841002): Difference between revisions

The subject matter of this paper is relations of first-order theories with truth predicates and second-order number theories. In the first part of the paper, the author presents a non-technical discussion about the natures of reductions. Ontological reductions replace the set notion by the truth notion in one way or another. But this is not really a reduction; for, unless sets are there already, how can you reduce them? Proof-theoretic reductions are free from such difficulties, because they are translations among formal theories. But there are so many notions -- local interpretations, asymmetric interpretations, etc. The second part of the paper is a report of the present state of affairs as to reducibility and implication. It begins with a 2 page chart of about 30 systems in order of strength. Since the author takes PA as the base theory, it is the weakest among both truth-theoretic and second-order systems. The strongest are Kripke's supervaluations and bar induction, respectively. Concise explanations of these systems are given, making this report a guide for further reading.