On the relationship of the Condorcet winner and positional voting rules (Q1277472): Difference between revisions

@@ Property / author @@
+Vincent R. Merlin
@@ Property / author: Vincent R. Merlin / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / MaRDI profile type @@
+MaRDI publication profile
@@ Property / MaRDI profile type: MaRDI publication profile / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+On probability models in voting theory
@@ Property / cites work: On probability models in voting theory / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Probabilities of election outcomes for large electorates
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+On the volume of hyperbolic polyhedra
@@ Property / cites work: On the volume of hyperbolic polyhedra / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Geometry of voting
@@ Property / cites work: Geometry of voting / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+The likelihood of dubious election outcomes
@@ Property / cites work: The likelihood of dubious election outcomes / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+The Borda method is most likely to respect the Condorcet principle
+Normal rank
@@ Property / full work available at URL @@
+https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-4896(97)00005-x
+Normal rank
@@ Property / OpenAlex ID @@
+W2083278702
@@ Property / OpenAlex ID: W2083278702 / rank @@
+Normal rank