Rent-seeking bureaucracies and oversight in a simple growth model (Q5941342): Difference between revisions
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Property / cites work: Bureaucracy, investment, and growth / rank | |||
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Property / cites work: Public investment in infrastructure in a simple growth model / rank | |||
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Property / cites work: Productive government expenditures and long-run growth / rank | |||
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Property / cites work: Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification / rank | |||
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Property / full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-1889(99)00057-3 / rank | |||
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Latest revision as of 12:10, 30 July 2024
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1635530
Language | Label | Description | Also known as |
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English | Rent-seeking bureaucracies and oversight in a simple growth model |
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1635530 |
Statements
Rent-seeking bureaucracies and oversight in a simple growth model (English)
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20 August 2001
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rent-seeking bureaucracies
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political authority
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public services
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growth rate
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