Monitoring the monitor: An incentive structure for a financial intermediary (Q1196667): Difference between revisions

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+Financial intermediary-coalitions
@@ Property / cites work: Financial intermediary-coalitions / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+The equilibrium allocation of investment capital in the presence of adverse selection and costly state verification
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring
@@ Property / cites work: Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Q3933198
@@ Property / cites work: Q3933198 / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Incentive-Compatible Debt Contracts: The One-Period Problem
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Monitoring the monitor: An incentive structure for a financial intermediary
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Optimal Contracts when Enforcement is a Decision Variable: A Reply
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Q4443503
@@ Property / cites work: Q4443503 / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / full work available at URL @@
+https://doi.org/10.1016/s0022-0531(05)80048-1
+Normal rank
@@ Property / OpenAlex ID @@
+W2095580670
@@ Property / OpenAlex ID: W2095580670 / rank @@
+Normal rank