Crowdsourcing contests (Q2332996): Difference between revisions

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Latest revision as of 15:42, 31 July 2024

scientific article
Language Label Description Also known as
English
Crowdsourcing contests
scientific article

    Statements

    Crowdsourcing contests (English)
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    6 November 2019
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    game theory
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    crowdsourcing
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    contest
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    all-pay auction
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    Identifiers