When punishers might be loved: fourth-party choices and third-party punishment in a delegation game (Q2694756): Difference between revisions

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+The Evolution of Cooperation
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+Normal rank
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+Competitive helping increases with the size of biological markets and invades defection
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+Coordinated Punishment of Defectors Sustains Cooperation and Can Proliferate When Rare
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+Observable Contracts: Strategic Delegation and Cooperation
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+Fairness in simple bargaining experiments
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+Via Freedom to Coercion: The Emergence of Costly Punishment
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+Evolution of cooperation and altruistic punishment when retaliation is possible
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+Third-party punishment as a costly signal of high continuation probabilities in repeated games
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+Strategic Delegation By Unobservable Incentive Contracts
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+Bargaining through agents: An experimental study of delegation and commitment
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+Choosing the Carrot or the Stick? Endogenous Institutional Choice in Social Dilemma Situations
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