Note on collusion with network externalities in price versus quantity competition (Q6074920): Difference between revisions

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Property / full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/ijet.12326 / rank
 
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Latest revision as of 05:55, 3 August 2024

scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7752450
Language Label Description Also known as
English
Note on collusion with network externalities in price versus quantity competition
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7752450

    Statements

    Note on collusion with network externalities in price versus quantity competition (English)
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    19 October 2023
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    Bertrand
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    Cournot
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    network externalities
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    stability of collusion
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