Costly information acquisition in centralized matching markets (Q6185480): Difference between revisions

From MaRDI portal
Importer (talk | contribs)
Created a new Item
 
ReferenceBot (talk | contribs)
Changed an Item
 
(One intermediate revision by one other user not shown)
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Assignment mechanisms: common preferences and information acquisition / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Assortative Matching with Explicit Search Costs / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Serial dictatorship: The unique optimal allocation rule when information is endogenous / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: How lotteries in school choice help to level the playing field / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Voting with endogenous information acquisition: experimental evidence / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: The iterative deferred acceptance mechanism / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Simultaneous Search / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Information acquisition and provision in school choice: an experimental study / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Optimal truncation in matching markets / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: The Role of Common and Private Signals in Two-Sided Matching with Interviews / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Sorting and Decentralized Price Competition / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Costly information acquisition in centralized matching markets / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: LEARNING MATTERS: REAPPRAISING OBJECT ALLOCATION RULES WHEN AGENTS STRATEGICALLY INVESTIGATE / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Behavior in Multi-Unit Demand Auctions: Experiments with Uniform Price and Dynamic Vickrey Auctions / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Implementing efficient multi-object auction institutions: An experimental study of the performance of boundedly rational agents / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Static versus dynamic deferred acceptance in school choice: theory and experiment / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Strategic experimentation with random serial dictatorship / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: The instability of matching with overconfident agents / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Assortative Matching and Search / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Information acquisition and provision in school choice: a theoretical investigation / rank
 
Normal rank
links / mardi / namelinks / mardi / name
 

Latest revision as of 11:09, 22 August 2024

scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7784896
Language Label Description Also known as
English
Costly information acquisition in centralized matching markets
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7784896

    Statements

    Costly information acquisition in centralized matching markets (English)
    0 references
    0 references
    0 references
    0 references
    8 January 2024
    0 references
    matching market
    0 references
    deferred acceptance
    0 references
    serial dictatorship
    0 references
    information acquisition
    0 references
    game theory
    0 references
    lab experiment
    0 references
    0 references

    Identifiers