Monotonicity of Optimal Contracts Without the First-Order Approach (Q4971397): Difference between revisions

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Latest revision as of 11:07, 28 August 2024

scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7258970
Language Label Description Also known as
English
Monotonicity of Optimal Contracts Without the First-Order Approach
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7258970

    Statements

    Monotonicity of Optimal Contracts Without the First-Order Approach (English)
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    12 October 2020
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    moral hazard problems
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    monotonicity
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    optimality conditions
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