Bank bailouts: moral hazard and commitment (Q6121881): Difference between revisions

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Property / full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.102939 / rank
 
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Latest revision as of 10:05, 29 August 2024

scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7825052
Language Label Description Also known as
English
Bank bailouts: moral hazard and commitment
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7825052

    Statements

    Bank bailouts: moral hazard and commitment (English)
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    26 March 2024
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    bank runs
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    bailouts
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    moral hazard
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    financial regulations
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