Dynamic contracting with persistent shocks (Q1007324): Difference between revisions

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Latest revision as of 10:08, 25 September 2024

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Dynamic contracting with persistent shocks
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    Dynamic contracting with persistent shocks (English)
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    20 March 2009
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    persistence
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    principal-agent problem
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    stochastic control problem
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    efficiency lines
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