Single-dipped preferences with satiation: strong group strategy-proofness and unanimity (Q331702): Difference between revisions

@@ Property / DOI @@
-.1007/s00355-016-0957-0
@@ Property / DOI: 10.1007/s00355-016-0957-0 / rank @@
-Normal rank
@@ Property / Mathematics Subject Classification ID @@
+B14
@@ Property / Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14 / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / Mathematics Subject Classification ID @@
+B18
@@ Property / Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B18 / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / zbMATH DE Number @@
+6644510
@@ Property / zbMATH DE Number: 6644510 / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / zbMATH Keywords @@
+single-dipped preference
@@ Property / zbMATH Keywords: single-dipped preference / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / zbMATH Keywords @@
+public bads
@@ Property / zbMATH Keywords: public bads / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / zbMATH Keywords @@
+group strategy-proofness
@@ Property / zbMATH Keywords: group strategy-proofness / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / zbMATH Keywords @@
+unanimity
@@ Property / zbMATH Keywords: unanimity / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / MaRDI profile type @@
+MaRDI publication profile
@@ Property / MaRDI profile type: MaRDI publication profile / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / full work available at URL @@
+https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-016-0957-0
+Normal rank
@@ Property / OpenAlex ID @@
+W2319209857
@@ Property / OpenAlex ID: W2319209857 / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Individual versus group strategy-proofness: when do they coincide?
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Domains, ranges and strategy-proofness: the case of single-dipped preferences
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Group strategy-proof social choice functions with binary ranges and arbitrary domains: characterization results
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Single-plateaued choice
@@ Property / cites work: Single-plateaued choice / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Choosing the level of a public good when agents have an outside option
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Multiple public goods and lexicographic preferences: Replacement principle
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Multiple public goods, lexicographic preferences, and single-plateaued preference rules.
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
@@ Property / cites work: Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Efficient and strategy-proof social choice when preferences are single-dipped
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Strategy-proof location of a public bad on a disc
@@ Property / cites work: Strategy-proof location of a public bad on a disc / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
+Normal rank
@@ Property / DOI @@
+.1007/S00355-016-0957-0
@@ Property / DOI: 10.1007/S00355-016-0957-0 / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ links / mardi / name / links / mardi / name @@
+Publication:331702