Single-dipped preferences with satiation: strong group strategy-proofness and unanimity (Q331702): Difference between revisions

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Latest revision as of 14:39, 9 December 2024

scientific article
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English
Single-dipped preferences with satiation: strong group strategy-proofness and unanimity
scientific article

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    Single-dipped preferences with satiation: strong group strategy-proofness and unanimity (English)
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    27 October 2016
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    single-dipped preference
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    public bads
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    group strategy-proofness
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    unanimity
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