Why do popular mechanisms lack efficiency in random environments? (Q840694): Difference between revisions

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Property / DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2009.05.003 / rank
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Latest revision as of 04:52, 10 December 2024

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Why do popular mechanisms lack efficiency in random environments?
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    Why do popular mechanisms lack efficiency in random environments? (English)
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    14 September 2009
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    indivisible goods
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    random priority
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    probabilistic serial
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    top trading cycles
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    ordinal efficiency
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