The agency problem between the owner and the manager in real investment: The bonus-audit relationship (Q943782): Difference between revisions

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Property / DOI: 10.1016/j.orl.2007.09.008 / rank
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Property / full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2007.09.008 / rank
 
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Property / OpenAlex ID: W2089151278 / rank
 
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Property / cites work: Real options and preemption under incomplete information / rank
 
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Property / cites work: Evaluation of firm's loss due to incomplete information in real investment decision / rank
 
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Property / cites work: Strategic Delay in a Real Options Model of R&D Competition / rank
 
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Property / DOI: 10.1016/J.ORL.2007.09.008 / rank
 
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Latest revision as of 09:10, 10 December 2024

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The agency problem between the owner and the manager in real investment: The bonus-audit relationship
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    The agency problem between the owner and the manager in real investment: The bonus-audit relationship (English)
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    10 September 2008
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    real options
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    asymmetric information
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    agency conflicts
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    audit
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