Optimal incentive contracts under inequity aversion (Q980958): Difference between revisions

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-.1016/j.geb.2009.12.007
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+Are CEOs Rewarded for Luck? The Ones Without Principals Are
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+Promises and Partnership
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+Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests
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+A tractable model of reciprocity and fairness
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+A theory of sequential reciprocity
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+A theory of reciprocity
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+A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
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+Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives
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+Limited liability and incentive contracting with ex-ante action choices
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+Justifying the First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems
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+The Theory of Moral Hazard and Unobservable Behaviour: Part I
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+The First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems
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@@ Property / DOI @@
+.1016/J.GEB.2009.12.007
@@ Property / DOI: 10.1016/J.GEB.2009.12.007 / rank @@
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@@ links / mardi / name / links / mardi / name @@
+Publication:980958