Switching costs in infinitely repeated games (Q1021599): Difference between revisions

@@ Property / DOI @@
-.1016/j.geb.2008.04.018
@@ Property / DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2008.04.018 / rank @@
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@@ Property / full work available at URL @@
+https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2008.04.018
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+W2131422298
@@ Property / OpenAlex ID: W2131422298 / rank @@
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+The Folk Theorem for Repeated Games: A Neu Condition
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Characterizations of the equilibrium payoffs of inertia supergames
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+A folk theorem for stochastic games
@@ Property / cites work: A folk theorem for stochastic games / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Subgame-perfect equilibria of finite- and infinite-horizon games
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+On the dispensability of public randomization in discounted repeated games
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Q2816007
@@ Property / cites work: Q2816007 / rank @@
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Switching costs in frequently repeated games.
@@ Property / cites work: Switching costs in frequently repeated games. / rank @@
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+The "Folk Theorem" for Repeated Games with Complete Information
+Normal rank
@@ Property / DOI @@
+.1016/J.GEB.2008.04.018
@@ Property / DOI: 10.1016/J.GEB.2008.04.018 / rank @@
+Normal rank