Monotonicity and Nash implementation in matching markets with contracts (Q1031836): Difference between revisions

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-.1007/s00199-008-0399-8
@@ Property / DOI: 10.1007/s00199-008-0399-8 / rank @@
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+MaRDI publication profile
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+W2120452336
@@ Property / OpenAlex ID: W2120452336 / rank @@
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Stable schedule matching under revealed preference.
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+Monotonic and implementable solutions in generalized matching problems.
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+College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
@@ Property / cites work: College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage / rank @@
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+Group incentive compatibility for matching with contracts
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+Construction of Outcome Functions Guaranteeing Existence and Pareto Optimality of Nash Equilibria
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+A crash course in implementation theory
@@ Property / cites work: A crash course in implementation theory / rank @@
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+Nash implementation of matching rules
@@ Property / cites work: Nash implementation of matching rules / rank @@
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+Implementation of college admission rules
@@ Property / cites work: Implementation of college admission rules / rank @@
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+Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
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+Stable many-to-many matchings with contracts
@@ Property / cites work: Stable many-to-many matchings with contracts / rank @@
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+Single agents and the set of many-to-one stable matchings
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+Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
@@ Property / cites work: Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality / rank @@
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+Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization
@@ Property / cites work: Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization / rank @@
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+The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
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+Stability and Polarization of Interests in Job Matching
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+The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Q3999327
@@ Property / cites work: Q3999327 / rank @@
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+The implementation of social choice functions via social choice correspondences: A general formulation and a limit result
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+On cores and indivisibility
@@ Property / cites work: On cores and indivisibility / rank @@
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+Implementation in generalized matching problems
@@ Property / cites work: Implementation in generalized matching problems / rank @@
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+On Nash implementation of social choice correspondences
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@@ Property / DOI @@
+.1007/S00199-008-0399-8
@@ Property / DOI: 10.1007/S00199-008-0399-8 / rank @@
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