Simple mechanisms to implement the core of college admissions problems (Q1577962): Difference between revisions

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-.1006/game.1999.0743
@@ Property / DOI: 10.1006/game.1999.0743 / rank @@
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+Implementation of stable solutions to marriage problems
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+Top dominance and the possibility of strategy-proof stable solutions to matching problems
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+Hiring procedures to implement stable allocations
@@ Property / cites work: Hiring procedures to implement stable allocations / rank @@
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+College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
@@ Property / cites work: College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage / rank @@
+Normal rank
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+Implementation in Undominated Strategies: A Look at Bounded Mechanisms
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+Implementation of college admission rules
@@ Property / cites work: Implementation of college admission rules / rank @@
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+The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
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+The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
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+Q3999327
@@ Property / cites work: Q3999327 / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / DOI @@
+.1006/GAME.1999.0743
@@ Property / DOI: 10.1006/GAME.1999.0743 / rank @@
+Normal rank