Incentive mechanism design for production economies with both private and public ownerships (Q1592728): Difference between revisions

\textit{J. E. Roemer} and \textit{J. Silvestre} [J. Econ. Theory 59, No. 2, 426--444 (1993; Zbl 0771.90026)] introduced the notion of the proportional solution for general convex economies with both private and public ownership with endogenous profit distributions, which generalizes in some sense the Walrasian equilibrium principle. Like the Walrasian mechanism the proportional solution mechanism is not incentive-compatible. This paper investigates the incentive aspect of the proportional solutions for general convex economies using mechanisms, in which Nash allocations and also strong Nash allocations coincide with proportional allocations. The new model is explicitely described and the results are given with full proofs. Some open questions are added.