Incompatibility between stability and consistency (Q1672771): Difference between revisions

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Property / DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2016.11.022 / rank
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Property / full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2016.11.022 / rank
 
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Property / OpenAlex ID: W2550873507 / rank
 
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Property / Wikidata QID: Q57428950 / rank
 
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Property / cites work
 
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Property / DOI
 
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Latest revision as of 02:22, 11 December 2024

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Incompatibility between stability and consistency
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