Games of corruption in preventing the overuse of common-pool resources (Q1704228): Difference between revisions

@@ Property / DOI @@
-.1016/j.jtbi.2017.06.001
@@ Property / DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2017.06.001 / rank @@
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@@ Property / full work available at URL @@
+https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2017.06.001
+Normal rank
@@ Property / OpenAlex ID @@
+W2624571048
@@ Property / OpenAlex ID: W2624571048 / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / Wikidata QID @@
+Q46353162
@@ Property / Wikidata QID: Q46353162 / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Trade liberalization, corruption, and environmental policy formation: Theory and evidence.
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Graduated punishment is efficient in resource management if people are heterogeneous
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Games of corruption: how to suppress illegal logging
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Social control and the social contract: the emergence of sanctioning systems for collective action
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+The survival of the conformist: social pressure and renewable resource management
+Normal rank
@@ Property / DOI @@
+.1016/J.JTBI.2017.06.001
@@ Property / DOI: 10.1016/J.JTBI.2017.06.001 / rank @@
+Normal rank