Welfare and incentives in partitioned school choice markets (Q1735744): Difference between revisions

@@ Property / DOI @@
-.1016/j.geb.2018.09.015
@@ Property / DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.09.015 / rank @@
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@@ Property / full work available at URL @@
+https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2018.09.015
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@@ Property / OpenAlex ID @@
+W2894935954
@@ Property / OpenAlex ID: W2894935954 / rank @@
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
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+College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
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+Some remarks on the stable matching problem
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+Ms. Machiavelli and the Stable Matching Problem
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+School Choice with Consent<sup>*</sup>
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+Two school systems, one district: what to do when a unified admissions process is impossible
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+The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
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+The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
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+Median stable matching for markets with wages
@@ Property / cites work: Median stable matching for markets with wages / rank @@
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@@ Property / Wikidata QID @@
+Q129141575
@@ Property / Wikidata QID: Q129141575 / rank @@
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@@ Property / DOI @@
+.1016/J.GEB.2018.09.015
@@ Property / DOI: 10.1016/J.GEB.2018.09.015 / rank @@
+Normal rank