Separability and decomposition in mechanism design with transfers (Q1753288): Difference between revisions

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Latest revision as of 08:21, 11 December 2024

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Separability and decomposition in mechanism design with transfers
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    Separability and decomposition in mechanism design with transfers (English)
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    29 May 2018
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    separable types
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    affine maximizer
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    Roberts' theorem
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