Equilibrium play in voluntary ultimatum games: beneficence cannot be extorted (Q1753304): Difference between revisions
From MaRDI portal
Set profile property. |
Normalize DOI. |
||
(2 intermediate revisions by 2 users not shown) | |||
Property / DOI | |||
Property / DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.01.006 / rank | |||
Property / OpenAlex ID | |||
Property / OpenAlex ID: W2753366591 / rank | |||
Normal rank | |||
Property / cites work | |||
Property / cites work: Q4805737 / rank | |||
Normal rank | |||
Property / cites work | |||
Property / cites work: Learning to accept in ultimatum games: Evidence from an experimental design that generates low offers / rank | |||
Normal rank | |||
Property / cites work | |||
Property / cites work: Second chance offers versus sequential auctions: theory and behavior / rank | |||
Normal rank | |||
Property / cites work | |||
Property / cites work: Subgame perfection in ultimatum bargaining trees / rank | |||
Normal rank | |||
Property / cites work | |||
Property / cites work: Participation costs for responders can reduce rejection rates in ultimatum bargaining / rank | |||
Normal rank | |||
Property / DOI | |||
Property / DOI: 10.1016/J.GEB.2018.01.006 / rank | |||
Normal rank |
Latest revision as of 08:21, 11 December 2024
scientific article
Language | Label | Description | Also known as |
---|---|---|---|
English | Equilibrium play in voluntary ultimatum games: beneficence cannot be extorted |
scientific article |
Statements
Equilibrium play in voluntary ultimatum games: beneficence cannot be extorted (English)
0 references
29 May 2018
0 references
ultimatum games
0 references
voluntary play
0 references
Adam Smith
0 references
experimental economics
0 references
0 references