Equilibrium play in voluntary ultimatum games: beneficence cannot be extorted (Q1753304): Difference between revisions

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Property / DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.01.006 / rank
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Property / OpenAlex ID: W2753366591 / rank
 
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Property / cites work: Q4805737 / rank
 
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Property / cites work: Learning to accept in ultimatum games: Evidence from an experimental design that generates low offers / rank
 
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Property / cites work: Second chance offers versus sequential auctions: theory and behavior / rank
 
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Property / cites work: Subgame perfection in ultimatum bargaining trees / rank
 
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Property / cites work: Participation costs for responders can reduce rejection rates in ultimatum bargaining / rank
 
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Property / DOI: 10.1016/J.GEB.2018.01.006 / rank
 
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Latest revision as of 08:21, 11 December 2024

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Equilibrium play in voluntary ultimatum games: beneficence cannot be extorted
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