Optimal multi-unit allocation with costly verification (Q6084797): Difference between revisions

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-.1007/s00355-023-01463-5
@@ Property / DOI: 10.1007/s00355-023-01463-5 / rank @@
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+Implementation with partial provability
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+Mechanisms With Evidence: Commitment and Robustness
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+Samurai Accountant: A Theory of Auditing and Plunder
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+Hard evidence and mechanism design
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+Mechanism design with partial state verifiability
@@ Property / cites work: Mechanism design with partial state verifiability / rank @@
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+Whether or not to open Pandora's box
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+Optimal on-line allocation rules with verification
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+A note on optimal allocation with costly verification
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+Costly verification in collective decisions
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+Incentive-Compatible Debt Contracts: The One-Period Problem
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+On Optimal Rules of Persuasion
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+Partially Verifiable Information and Mechanism Design
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+Implementation with evidence
@@ Property / cites work: Implementation with evidence / rank @@
+Normal rank
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+Mechanism design with costly verification and limited punishments
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+Mechanism design with financially constrained agents and costly verification
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+Optimal dynamic mechanism design with deadlines
@@ Property / cites work: Optimal dynamic mechanism design with deadlines / rank @@
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+Q3576736
@@ Property / cites work: Q3576736 / rank @@
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+Price discrimination through communication
@@ Property / cites work: Price discrimination through communication / rank @@
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification
+Normal rank
@@ Property / DOI @@
+.1007/S00355-023-01463-5
@@ Property / DOI: 10.1007/S00355-023-01463-5 / rank @@
+Normal rank