Variations on da Costa C systems and dual-intuitionistic logics. I: Analyses of \(C_{\omega}\) and \(CC_{\omega}\) (Q809995): Difference between revisions

Da Costa's hierarchy of paraconsistent systems \(C_ n\), \(1\leq n\leq \omega\), is presented and some of its main characteristics are discussed. The author argues that, in spite of their importance and strength, for some purposes the C systems have serious philosophical and technical drawbacks (like, for instance, their failing to guarantee intersubstitutivity of equivalents - SE). The aim of this paper is to introduce some variations of da Costa's systems, in an attempt to surmount those limitations considered. The systems \(CC_ n\), \(1\leq n\leq \omega\), are introduced; and as a natural consequence of their definition, it is proved that all the \(CC_ n\), \(1\leq n<\omega\), collapse to classical logic, what is avoided in \(CC_{\omega}\). The main system \(CC_{\omega}\), which in fact fails to meet one of da Costa's paraconsistent requirements of adequacy (non- contradiction \(\neg (A\&\neg A)\) is a theorem of \(CC_{\omega})\), is then investigated in some detail, ``dual-intuitionistic'' semantical analyses being developed for it and several surrounding systems. These semantics are then adapted, in two different ways, to the original C systems, in the second way through the introduction of impossible situations where \textit{and} and \textit{or} change their roles. Finally, the author presents other attempts to break out of impasses for the original and expanded C systems and proves that there is no extension of a \(C_ n\) system, \(1\leq n<\omega\), conforming to SE, weaker than classical logic.