Strategic manipulability of self-selective social choice rules (Q492810): Difference between revisions

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-.1007/s10479-014-1763-7
@@ Property / DOI: 10.1007/s10479-014-1763-7 / rank @@
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+https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-014-1763-7
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+W3022398878
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+Q4495209
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+Self-selection consistent functions
@@ Property / cites work: Self-selection consistent functions / rank @@
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+Choosing How to Choose: Self-Stable Majority Rules and Constitutions
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+An example of probability computations under the IAC assumption: the stability of scoring rules
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+On the stability of a triplet of scoring rules
@@ Property / cites work: On the stability of a triplet of scoring rules / rank @@
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+Q3282061
@@ Property / cites work: Q3282061 / rank @@
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+Sur un probl?me de g?om?trie diophantienne lin?aire. I. Poly?dres et r?seaux.
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+Some further results on the manipulability of social choice rules
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+Borda rule, Copeland method and strategic manipulation.
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+Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
@@ Property / cites work: Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result / rank @@
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+Minimal manipulability: anonymity and unanimity
@@ Property / cites work: Minimal manipulability: anonymity and unanimity / rank @@
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+Almost all social choice rules are highly manipulable, but a few aren't
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+Self-Selective Social Choice Functions Verify Arrow and Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorems
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+Characterization of self-selective social choice functions on the tops-only domain
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+In Silico Voting Experiments
@@ Property / cites work: In Silico Voting Experiments / rank @@
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+On Ehrhart polynomials and probability calculations in voting theory
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+The proportion of coalitionally unstable situations under the plurality rule
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+The vulnerability of four social choice functions to coalitional manipulation of preferences
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+Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
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+Manipulability measures of common social choice functions
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+Probability calculations under the IAC hypothesis
@@ Property / cites work: Probability calculations under the IAC hypothesis / rank @@
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@@ Property / DOI @@
+.1007/S10479-014-1763-7
@@ Property / DOI: 10.1007/S10479-014-1763-7 / rank @@
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