The stability of many-to-many matching with max-min preferences (Q500490): Difference between revisions

@@ Property / DOI @@
-.1016/j.econlet.2015.02.009
@@ Property / DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2015.02.009 / rank @@
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@@ Property / author @@
-Zhen-Hua Jiao
@@ Property / author: Zhen-Hua Jiao / rank @@
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@@ Property / author @@
+Zhen-Hua Jiao
@@ Property / author: Zhen-Hua Jiao / rank @@
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@@ Property / MaRDI profile type @@
+MaRDI publication profile
@@ Property / MaRDI profile type: MaRDI publication profile / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / full work available at URL @@
+https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2015.02.009
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@@ Property / OpenAlex ID @@
+W2099022823
@@ Property / OpenAlex ID: W2099022823 / rank @@
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Many-to-many matching: stable polyandrous polygamy (or polygamous polyandry)
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
@@ Property / cites work: College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage / rank @@
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Many-to-many matching with max-min preferences
@@ Property / cites work: Many-to-many matching with max-min preferences / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Stable many-to-many matchings with contracts
@@ Property / cites work: Stable many-to-many matchings with contracts / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Games of capacity manipulation in hospital-intern markets
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Three remarks on the many-to-many stable matching problem
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@@ Property / DOI @@
+.1016/J.ECONLET.2015.02.009
@@ Property / DOI: 10.1016/J.ECONLET.2015.02.009 / rank @@
+Normal rank