At-will relationships: how an option to walk away affects cooperation and efficiency (Q523516): Difference between revisions

@@ Property / DOI @@
-.1016/j.geb.2017.02.007
@@ Property / DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.02.007 / rank @@
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@@ Property / author @@
-Hong Wu
@@ Property / author: Hong Wu / rank @@
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@@ Property / MaRDI profile type @@
+MaRDI publication profile
@@ Property / MaRDI profile type: MaRDI publication profile / rank @@
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@@ Property / full work available at URL @@
+https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.02.007
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+W2592122382
@@ Property / OpenAlex ID: W2592122382 / rank @@
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@@ Property / DOI @@
+.1016/J.GEB.2017.02.007
@@ Property / DOI: 10.1016/J.GEB.2017.02.007 / rank @@
+Normal rank