Optimal allocation mechanisms with single-dimensional private information (Q645061): Difference between revisions

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Latest revision as of 14:40, 4 July 2024

scientific article
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Optimal allocation mechanisms with single-dimensional private information
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    Optimal allocation mechanisms with single-dimensional private information (English)
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    8 November 2011
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    multi-unit auctions
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    type-dependent outside options
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    externalities
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    mechanism design
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    interdependent values
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