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Property / author: Robert John Aumann / rank
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Property / author: Sylvain Sorin / rank
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Property / author: Sylvain Sorin / rank
 
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Property / full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0899-8256(89)90003-1 / rank
 
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Property / OpenAlex ID: W1990631055 / rank
 
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Latest revision as of 16:14, 21 June 2024

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Cooperation and bounded recall
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    Cooperation and bounded recall (English)
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    1989
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    Let G be a two-player game with a unique Pareto-optimal outcome. Consider the supergame which infinitely repeats G, and perturbations of this supergame, in which a player plays with small probability a fixed strategy with bounded recall. Then the perturbed supergame has a pure strategy Nash equilibrium, and payoffs at this equilibrium are close to optimal. This remarkable result shows how optimality is a rational outcome in a game with boundedly rational players.
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    unique Pareto-optimal outcome
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    supergame
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    perturbations
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    boundedly rational players
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