Individually rational, budget-balanced mechanisms and allocation of surplus (Q928879): Difference between revisions

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+MaRDI publication profile
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+https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2007.07.002
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+W2019313657
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@@ Property / cites work @@
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+Informational size and incentive compatibility with aggregate uncertainty.
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+A characterization of efficient, Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms
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