Games of school choice under the Boston mechanism with general priority structures (Q944257): Difference between revisions

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Property / DOI: 10.1007/s00355-007-0287-3 / rank
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Property / OpenAlex ID: W2055575901 / rank
 
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Property / DOI: 10.1007/S00355-007-0287-3 / rank
 
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Latest revision as of 09:14, 10 December 2024

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Games of school choice under the Boston mechanism with general priority structures
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