Strategic voting when participation is costly (Q2002354): Difference between revisions

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Property / DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2019.04.010 / rank
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Property / cites work: Costly voting with multiple candidates under plurality rule / rank
 
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Property / cites work: One Person, Many Votes: Divided Majority and Information Aggregation / rank
 
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Property / cites work: Welfare reducing polls / rank
 
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Property / cites work: Is mandatory voting better than voluntary voting? / rank
 
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Property / cites work: Large Poisson games / rank
 
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Property / DOI: 10.1016/J.GEB.2019.04.010 / rank
 
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Latest revision as of 17:46, 16 December 2024

scientific article
Language Label Description Also known as
English
Strategic voting when participation is costly
scientific article

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    Strategic voting when participation is costly (English)
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    12 July 2019
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    multiparty elections
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    plurality rule
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    costly voting
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    Duverger's law
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    strategic voting
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