Strategy-proof club formation with indivisible club facilities (Q2088896): Difference between revisions

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Property / author: Bhaskar Dutta / rank
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Property / author: Bhaskar Dutta / rank
 
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Property / MaRDI profile type: MaRDI publication profile / rank
 
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Property / full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-021-00251-w / rank
 
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Property / OpenAlex ID: W3158347703 / rank
 
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Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: The stability of hedonic coalition structures / rank
 
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Property / cites work: Public goods, growth, and welfare / rank
 
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Property / cites work: The strategy-proof provision of public goods under congestion and crowding preferences / rank
 
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Property / cites work: Strategy-proof group selection under single-peaked preferences over group size / rank
 
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Property / cites work: Efficient and stable collective choices under gregarious preferences / rank
 
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Latest revision as of 08:18, 30 July 2024

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Strategy-proof club formation with indivisible club facilities
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