Group efforts when performance is determined by the ``best shot'' (Q2249577): Difference between revisions

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+MaRDI publication profile
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+https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-013-0787-6
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+W2073286417
@@ Property / OpenAlex ID: W2073286417 / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Private provision of a discrete public good: efficient equilibria in the private-information contribution game
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Q4836494
@@ Property / cites work: Q4836494 / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+A note on budget balance under interim participation constraints: The case of independent types
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Reciprocity, matching and conditional cooperation in two public goods games
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Mixed-strategy equilibria and strong purification for games with private and public information
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+A simple game-theoretic explanation for the relationship between group size and helping
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+The impact of endowment heterogeneity and origin on contributions in best-shot public good games
+Normal rank