Effectiveness of conditional punishment for the evolution of public cooperation (Q2351098): Difference between revisions

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Latest revision as of 07:25, 10 July 2024

scientific article
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Effectiveness of conditional punishment for the evolution of public cooperation
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    Effectiveness of conditional punishment for the evolution of public cooperation (English)
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    23 June 2015
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    public goods
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    punishment
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    structured populations
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    conditional strategies
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