Effectiveness of conditional punishment for the evolution of public cooperation (Q2351098): Difference between revisions

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@@ Property / DOI @@
-.1016/j.jtbi.2013.02.008
@@ Property / DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2013.02.008 / rank @@
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+.3546
@@ Property / arXiv ID: 1302.3546 / rank @@
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+The joker effect: cooperation driven by destructive agents
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+The evolution of strong reciprocity: cooperation in heterogeneous populations
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Coordinated Punishment of Defectors Sustains Cooperation and Can Proliferate When Rare
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Leaving the loners alone: evolution of cooperation in the presence of antisocial punishment
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Evolutionary games defined at the network mesoscale: The Public Goods game
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Replicator dynamics of reward \& reputation in public goods games
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Via Freedom to Coercion: The Emergence of Costly Punishment
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Q5185817
@@ Property / cites work: Q5185817 / rank @@
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Positive Interactions Promote Public Cooperation
@@ Property / cites work: Positive Interactions Promote Public Cooperation / rank @@
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+The take-it-or-leave-it option allows small penalties to overcome social dilemmas
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Selection pressure transforms the nature of social dilemmas in adaptive networks
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Escaping the tragedy of the commons via directed investments
+Normal rank
@@ Property / DOI @@
+.1016/J.JTBI.2013.02.008
@@ Property / DOI: 10.1016/J.JTBI.2013.02.008 / rank @@
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@@ Property / Recommended article @@
+Evolution of cooperation with peer punishment under prospect theory
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+Conditional cooperator enhances institutional punishment in public goods game
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+Evolution of public cooperation with weighted and conditional strategies
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+Promote or hinder? The role of punishment in the emergence of cooperation
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+Sustaining cooperation in social dilemmas: comparison of centralized punishment institutions
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+Feedback, punishment and cooperation in public good experiments
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+Impact of punishment on the evolution of cooperation in spatial prisoner's dilemma game
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+Evolution of cooperation and altruistic punishment when retaliation is possible
+Normal rank
+Similarity Score: 0.8754102Amount 0.8754102
Unit 1
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+Recommender Run: Recommender Run 2