What price stability? Social welfare in matching markets (Q2446689): Difference between revisions

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+https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2013.09.004
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+W1968816121
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Anarchy, Stability, and Utopia: Creating Better Matchings
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+The Price of Stability for Network Design with Fair Cost Allocation
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+A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
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+Preferences and the price of stability in matching markets
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+College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
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+Unravelling in two-sided matching markets and similarity of preferences
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+School Choice with Consent<sup>*</sup>
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+``Fair marriages'': an impossibility
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+Median stable matching for college admissions
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+Fair and efficient student placement with couples
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+Smith and Rawls share a room: stability and medians
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+On the existence of fair matching algorithms
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+The Average Number of Stable Matchings
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+``Sex-equal'' stable matchings
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+Equitable selection in bilateral matching markets
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+Many-to-One Stable Matching: Geometry and Fairness
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+The Geometry of Fractional Stable Matchings and Its Applications
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+Backward unraveling over time: The evolution of strategic behavior in the entry level British medical labor markets
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+On the survival of some unstable two-sided matching mechanisms
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