An impossibility result for virtual implementation with status quo (Q2511258): Difference between revisions

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Property / full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2013.12.015 / rank
 
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Latest revision as of 20:57, 8 July 2024

scientific article
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English
An impossibility result for virtual implementation with status quo
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    An impossibility result for virtual implementation with status quo (English)
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    5 August 2014
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    virtual implementation
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    social choice rules
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    dictatorial rules
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    admissible support
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