Optimal incentive contracting with ex ante and ex post moral hazards: Theory and evidence (Q1367848): Difference between revisions
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Latest revision as of 03:06, 5 March 2024
scientific article
| Language | Label | Description | Also known as |
|---|---|---|---|
| English | Optimal incentive contracting with ex ante and ex post moral hazards: Theory and evidence |
scientific article |
Statements
Optimal incentive contracting with ex ante and ex post moral hazards: Theory and evidence (English)
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19 April 1998
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moral hazard
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managerial contracting
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workers' compensation
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