Can the seller benefit from an insider in common-value auctions? (Q1566907): Difference between revisions

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Property / DOI: 10.1006/jeth.1999.2600 / rank
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Property / full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1999.2600 / rank
 
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Property / OpenAlex ID: W2072493099 / rank
 
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Property / cites work: Competitive bidding and proprietary information / rank
 
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Property / cites work: Auctions for Oil and Gas Leases with an Informed Bidder and a Random Reservation Price / rank
 
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Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: An asymptotic solution for sealed bid common-value auctions with bidders having asymmetric information / rank
 
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Property / cites work: The value of information in a sealed-bid auction / rank
 
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Property / cites work: A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding / rank
 
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Property / cites work: Optimal Auction Design / rank
 
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Property / cites work: Note—Competitive Bidding with Asymmetric Information Reanalyzed / rank
 
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Property / DOI
 
Property / DOI: 10.1006/JETH.1999.2600 / rank
 
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Latest revision as of 04:14, 28 December 2024

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Can the seller benefit from an insider in common-value auctions?
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