Beyond the Spanish MIR with consent: (hidden) cooperation and coordination in matching (Q1651221): Difference between revisions

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-.1016/j.geb.2018.03.007
@@ Property / DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.03.007 / rank @@
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+W2596019922
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+Implementation of stable solutions to marriage problems
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+Top dominance and the possibility of strategy-proof stable solutions to matching problems
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+Hiring procedures to implement stable allocations
@@ Property / cites work: Hiring procedures to implement stable allocations / rank @@
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+The role of unions in hiring procedures for job markets
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+Simple mechanisms to implement the core of college admissions problems
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+The simplest equilibrium of a majority-rule division game
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+Rationalizable Strategic Behavior
@@ Property / cites work: Rationalizable Strategic Behavior / rank @@
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+College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
@@ Property / cites work: College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage / rank @@
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+Decentralized job matching
@@ Property / cites work: Decentralized job matching / rank @@
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+Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Stable matchings and rematching-proof equilibria in a two-sided matching market
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+The singleton core in the college admissions problem and its application to the national resident matching program (NRMP)
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+Dominance Solvable Voting Schemes
@@ Property / cites work: Dominance Solvable Voting Schemes / rank @@
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+Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Stability and Preference Alignment in Matching and Coalition Formation
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Non-revelation mechanisms in many-to-one markets
@@ Property / cites work: Non-revelation mechanisms in many-to-one markets / rank @@
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
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+Stability and Polarization of Interests in Job Matching
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+The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
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+Q3999327
@@ Property / cites work: Q3999327 / rank @@
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Manipulation via capacities in two-sided matching markets
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Reaching the core of the marriage market through a non-revelation matching mechanism
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+Hiring mechanisms, application costs and stability
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@@ Property / DOI @@
+.1016/J.GEB.2018.03.007
@@ Property / DOI: 10.1016/J.GEB.2018.03.007 / rank @@
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@@ links / mardi / name / links / mardi / name @@
+Publication:1651221