Asymptotic vulnerability of positional voting rules to coalitional manipulation (Q1680740): Difference between revisions

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Property / DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2017.06.006 / rank
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Property / full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2017.06.006 / rank
 
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Latest revision as of 03:04, 11 December 2024

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Asymptotic vulnerability of positional voting rules to coalitional manipulation
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    Asymptotic vulnerability of positional voting rules to coalitional manipulation (English)
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    16 November 2017
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    asymptotic vulnerability
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    positional voting rules
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    coalitional manipulation
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    three-candidate elections
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